GUIDANCE NOTE ON CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT
Chapter
1 - Policy Framework
1.1
Credit risk is defined as the possibility of losses associated with diminution
in the credit quality of borrowers or counterparties. In a bank’s portfolio,
losses stem from outright default due to inability or unwillingness of a
customer or counterparty to meet commitments in relation to lending, trading,
settlement and other financial transactions. Alternatively, losses result from
reduction in portfolio value arising from actual or perceived deterioration in
credit quality. Credit risk emanates
from a
bank’s dealings with an individual, corporate, bank, financial institution or a
sovereign. Credit risk may take the following forms:
Þ
in the case of direct lending: principal/and or interest
amount may not be repaid;
Þ
in the case of guarantees or letters of credit: funds may
not be forthcoming from the constituents upon crystallization of the liability;
Þ
in the case of treasury operations: the payment or series
of payments due from the counter parties under the respective contracts may not
be forthcoming or ceases;
Þ
in the case of securities trading businesses: funds/
securities settlement may not be effected;
Þ
in the case of cross-border exposure: the availability and
free transfer of foreign currency funds may either cease or restrictions may be
imposed by the sovereign.
1.2 In this backdrop, it is
imperative that banks have a robust credit risk
management system which is
sensitive and responsive to these factors.
The effective management of credit risk is a critical component of
comprehensive risk
management and is essential for the long term
success of any banking organisation. Credit risk management
encompasses identification,
measurement, monitoring and control of the
credit risk exposures.
1.3 Building Blocks of Credit Risk Management:
In a bank, an effective credit
risk management framework would comprise
of the following distinct building
blocks:
a)
Policy
and Strategy
b)
Organisational
Structure
c)
Operations/
Systems
1.4 Policy
and Strategy
The Board of Directors of each
bank shall be responsible for approving
and periodically reviewing the
credit risk strategy and significant credit
risk policies.
1.4.1 Credit Risk Policy
v Every
bank should have a credit risk policy document approved by the Board. The
document should include risk identification, risk measurement, risk grading/
aggregation techniques, reporting and risk control/ mitigation techniques,
documentation, legal issues and management of problem loans.
v Credit
risk policies should also define target markets, risk acceptance criteria,
credit approval authority, credit origination/ maintenance procedures and
guidelines for portfolio management.
v The
credit risk policies approved by the Board should be communicated to
branches/controlling offices. All dealing officials should clearly understand
the bank’s approach for credit sanction and should be held accountable for
complying with established policies and procedures.
v Senior
management of a bank shall be responsible for implementing the credit risk
policy approved by the Board.
1.4.2 Credit Risk Strategy
v Each
bank should develop, with the approval of its Board, its own credit risk
strategy or plan that establishes the objectives guiding the bank’s
credit-granting activities and adopt necessary policies/ procedures for
conducting such activities. This strategy should spell out clearly the
organisation’s credit appetite and the acceptable level of risk-reward
trade-off for its activities.
v The
strategy would, therefore, include a statement of the bank’s willingness to
grant loans based on the type of economic activity, geographical location,
currency, market, maturity and anticipated profitability. This would
necessarily translate into the identification of target markets and business
sectors, preferred levels of diversification
and
concentration, the cost of capital in granting credit and the cost of bad
debts.
v The
credit risk strategy should provide continuity in approach as also take into
account the cyclical aspects of the economy and the resulting shifts in the
composition/ quality of the overall credit portfolio. This strategy should be
viable in the long run and through various credit cycles.
v Senior
management of a bank shall be responsible for implementing the credit risk
strategy approved by the Board.
1.5 Organisational Structure
Sound
organizational structure is sine qua non for successful implementation of an
effective credit risk management system. The organizational structure for
credit risk management should have the following basic features:
The
Board of Directors should have the
overall responsibility for management of risks. The Board should decide the
risk management policy of the bank and set limits for liquidity, interest rate,
foreign exchange and equity price risks.
The
Risk Management Committee will be a
Board level Sub committee including CEO and heads of Credit, Market and
Operational Risk Management Committees. It will devise the policy and strategy
for integrated risk management containing various risk exposures of the bank
including the credit risk. For this purpose, this Committee should effectively
coordinate between the Credit Risk Management Committee (CRMC), the Asset
Liability Management Committee and other risk committees of the bank, if any.
It is imperative that the independence of this Committee is preserved. The
Board should, therefore, ensure that this is not compromised at any cost. In
the event of the Board not accepting any recommendation of this Committee,
systems should be put in place to spell out the rationale for such an action
and should be properly documented. This document should be made available to
the internal and external auditors for their scrutiny and comments. The credit
risk strategy and policies adopted by the committee should be effectively
communicated throughout the organisation.
1.5.1 Each bank may, depending on
the size of the organization or loan/
investment book, constitute a high level Credit Risk Management
Committee (CRMC). The Committee should be headed by the
Chairman/CEO/ED, and should
comprise of heads of Credit Department,
Treasury, Credit Risk Management
Department (CRMD) and the Chief
Economist. The
functions of the
Credit Risk Management
Committee
should be as under:
v Be
responsible for the implementation of the credit risk policy/ strategy approved
by the Board.
v Monitor
credit risk on a bank wide basis and ensure compliance with limits approved by
the Board.
v Recommend
to the Board, for its approval, clear policies on standards for presentation of
credit proposals, financial covenants, rating standards and benchmarks,
v Decide
delegation of credit approving powers, prudential limits on large credit
exposures, standards for loan collateral, portfolio management, loan review
mechanism, risk concentrations, risk monitoring and evaluation, pricing of
loans, provisioning, regulatory/legal compliance, etc.
1.5.2 Concurrently, each bank should also set up Credit Risk
Management Department (CRMD), independent of the Credit
Administration Department. The
CRMD should:
v Measure,
control and manage credit risk on a bank-wide basis within the limits set by
the Board/ CRMC
v Enforce
compliance with the risk parameters and prudential limits set by the Board/
CRMC.
v Lay
down risk assessment systems, develop MIS, monitor quality of loan/ investment
portfolio, identify problems, correct deficiencies and undertake loan review/audit.
Large banks could consider separate set up for loan review/audit.
v Be
accountable for protecting the quality of the entire loan/ investment
portfolio. The Department should undertake portfolio evaluations and conduct
comprehensive studies on the environment to test the resilience of the loan
portfolio.
1.6 Operations / Systems
Banks should have in place an
appropriate credit administration, credit risk
measurement and monitoring
processes. The credit administration process
typically involves the following
phases:
v Relationship
management phase i.e.
business development.
v Transaction management phase covers
risk assessment, loan pricing, structuring
the facilities, internal approvals, documentation, loan administration, on
going monitoring and risk measurement.
v Portfolio management phase entails
monitoring of the portfolio at a macro
level and the management of problem loans.
On the basis of the broad
management framework stated above, the banks
should have the following credit risk measurement and monitoring
procedures:
·
Banks should establish proactive credit risk management
practices like annual / half yearly industry studies and individual obligor
reviews, periodic credit calls that are documented, periodic visits of plant
and business site, and at least quarterly management reviews of troubled
exposures/weak credits.
·
Banks should have a system of checks and balances in place
for extension of credit viz.:
-
Separation
of credit risk management from credit sanction
-
Multiple
credit approvers making financial sanction subject to approvals at various
stages viz. credit ratings, risk approvals, credit approval grid, etc.
-
An
independent audit and risk review function.
·
The level of authority required to approve credit will
increase as amounts and transaction risks increase and as risk ratings worsen.
·
Every
obligor and facility must be assigned a risk rating.
·
Mechanism
to price facilities depending on the risk grading of the customer, and to
attribute accurately the associated risk weightings to the facilities.
·
Banks should ensure that there are consistent standards
for the origination, documentation and maintenance for extensions of credit.
·
Banks should have a consistent approach towards early
problem recognition, the classification of problem exposures, and remedial
action.
·
Banks
should maintain a diversified portfolio of risk assets; have a system to
conduct regular analysis of the portfolio and to ensure on-going control of
risk concentrations.
·
Credit risk limits include, obligor limits and
concentration limits by industry or geography. The Boards should authorize
efficient and effective credit approval processes for operating within the
approval limits.
·
In order to ensure transparency of risks taken, it is the
responsibility of banks to accurately, completely and in a timely fashion,
report the comprehensive set of credit risk data into the independent risk
system.
·
Banks
should have systems and procedures for monitoring financial performance of
customers and for controlling outstanding within limits.
·
A conservative policy for provisioning in respect of
non-performing advances may be adopted.
·
Successful
credit management requires experience, judgement and commitment to technical
development. Banks should have a clear, well-documented scheme of delegation of
powers for credit sanction.
Banks must have a Management
Information System (MIS), which should
enable them to manage and measure
the credit risk inherent in all on- and
off-balance
sheet activities. The MIS should provide
adequate information
on the composition of the credit
portfolio, including identification of any
concentration of risk. Banks
should price their loans according to the risk
profile of the borrower and the
risks associated with the loans.
TYPICAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
(BOARD SUBCOMMITTEE INCLUDING CEO AND HEADS OF
CREDIT, MARKET AND
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES)
CORE
FUNCTION: POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (COMMITTEE
OF TOP EXECUTIVES INCLUDING CEO, HEADS OF CREDIT & TREASURY, AND CHIEF
ECONOMIST)
ALCO/ MARKET
|
OPERATIONAL
|
RISK
|
RISK
|
MANAGEMENT
|
MANAGEMENT
|
COMMITTEE
|
COMMITTEE
|
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (CRMD)
CREDIT ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT (CAD)
Risk Planning
|
Risk
|
Assessment
|
Risk Analytics
|
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-
Definition of
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and Monitoring
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-
Credit Risk and
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procedures
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- Sector review
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pricing
models’
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-
Credit Rating
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design &
|
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- Design of
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- Review of Credit
|
maintenance
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||||||||||
credit
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Proposals
(new)
|
|||||||||||
processes
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-
Asset review
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-
Portfolio analysis
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||||||||||
(existing)
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and
reporting
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Credit
Risk –Systems
- Integration
of risk Procedures with credit systems
- Design and development of
support systems for risk assessment & monitoring
Chapter
2 - Credit Rating Framework
2.1 Background
A Credit-risk Rating Framework (CRF) is necessary to avoid the
limitations associated with a simplistic and broad classification of
loans/exposures into a “good” or a
“bad” category. The CRF deploys a
number/ alphabet/
symbol as a
primary summary indicator
of risks
associated with a credit exposure.
Such a rating framework is the basic
module for developing a credit
risk management system and all advanced
models/approaches are based on this structure. In spite of the
advancement in risk management
techniques, CRF is continued to be
used to a great extent. These
frameworks have been primarily driven by a
need to standardise and uniformly
communicate the “judgement” in credit
selection procedures and are not a substitute to the vast lending
experience accumulated by the
banks' professional staff.
2.2 End Use of Risk-Ratings made on the CRF
Broadly, CRF can be used for the following purposes:
a. Individual
credit selection, wherein either a borrower or a particular exposure/ facility
is rated on the CRF.
b. Pricing
(credit spread) and specific features of the loan facility. This would largely
constitute transaction-level analysis.
c.
Portfolio-level
analysis.
d.
Surveillance,
monitoring and internal MIS
e. Assessing
the aggregate risk profile of bank/ lender. These would be relevant for
portfolio-level analysis. For instance, the spread of credit exposures across
various CRF categories, the mean and the standard deviation of losses occurring
in each CRF category and the overall migration of exposures would highlight the
aggregated credit-risk for the entire portfolio of the bank.
The following elements outline the
basic architecture and the operating
principles of any CRF.
2.3.1 Grading system for
calibration of credit risk
§ Nature of grading system
§ Number of grades used
§ Key outputs of CRF
2.3.2 Operating design of CRF
§ Which exposures are rated?
§ The
risk rating process
§ Assigning and monitoring risk
ratings
§ The mechanism of arriving at risk
ratings
§ Standardisation and benchmark for
risk ratings
§ Written communications and
formality of procedures
2.3.3 CRFs and Portfolio Credit
Risk
§ Portfolio surveillance and
reporting
§ Adequate
levels of provisioning for credit events
§ Guidelines
for asset build up, aggregate profitability and pricing
§ Interaction with external credit
assessment institutions
The
architecture and operating principles are discussed in detail in the ensuing
paragraphs.
2.4 Grading System for Calibration of Credit Risk
The grades (symbols, numbers,
alphabets, descriptive terms) used in the
internal credit-risk grading system should represent, without any
ambiguity, the default risks
associated with an exposure. The grading
system should enable comparisons
of risks for purposes of analysis and
top management decision-making. It should also reflect regulatory
requirements of the supervisor on
asset classification (e.g. the RBI asset
classification). It is anticipated
that, over a period of time, the process of
risk identification and
risk assessment will
be further refined. The
grading system should, therefore,
be flexible and should accommodate the
refinements in risk
categorisation.
2.4.1 Nature of Grading System
for the CRF
The grading system adopted in a
CRF could be an alphabetic or numeric
or an alpha-numeric scale. Since rating
agencies follow a particular scale
Guidance
Note _ Credit Risk _ October_ 2002
(AAA,
AA+, BBB etc.), it would be prudent to adopt a different rating scale to avoid
confusion in internal communications. Besides, adoption of a different rating
scale would permit comparable benchmarking between the two mechanisms. Several
banks utilise a numeric rating scale. The number of grades for the “acceptable”
and the “unacceptable” credit risk categories would depend on the finesse of
risk gradation. Normally, numeric scales developed for CRFs are such that the
lower the credit-risk, the lower is the calibration on the scale.
Illustration
A
rating scale could consist of 9 levels, of which levels 1 to 5 represent
various grades of acceptable credit risk and levels 6 to 9 represent various
grades of unacceptable credit risk associated with an exposure.
The
scale, starting from “1” (which would represent lowest level credit risk and
highest level of safety/ comfort) and ending at “9” (which would represent the
highest level of credit risk and lowest level of safety/ comfort), could be
deployed to calibrate, benchmark, compare and monitor credit risk associated
with the bank’s exposures and give indicative guidelines for credit risk
management activities. Each bank may consider adopting suitable alphabetic
prefix to their rating scales, which would make their individual ratings scale
distinct and unique.
2.4.2 Number of Grades Used in
the CRF
The
number of grades used in the CRF depends on the anticipated spread in credit
quality of the exposures taken by the bank. This, in turn, is dependent on the
present and the future business profile of the bank and the anticipated level
of specialisation/ diversification in the credit portfolio. CRFs with a large
number of levels/ grades on the rating scale are, as evident, more expensive to
operate as the costs of additional information for (very) fine gradation of
credit-quality increase sharply. A bank can initiate the risk-grading activity
on a relative smaller/ narrower scale and introduce new categories as the
risk-gradation improves.
2.4.3 Key Outputs of the CRF
a. The
calibration on the rating scale is expected to define the pricing and related
terms and conditions for the accepted credit exposures. It is possible to
define broad pricing bands and directly link the band with the calibration on
the rating scale. Further refinement in the pricing proposal would be based on
the bank’s judgement of the prominent elements of the loan proposal and the
relationship with the borrower.
b. In
addition to the pricing related decisions, the calibration on the rating scale
would allow prescription of limits on the maximum quantum of exposure
permissible for any credit proposal. The quantum (or amount of facility
sanctioned) would depend on the credit-score on the CRF. These limits could be
linked to an internal parameter (viz. a certain percentage of bank’s capital
funds) or could be linked to an external parameter (viz. a certain percentage
of the total debt required by the borrower). This would help in a larger
dispersion of risk amongst lenders and limit risk concentration in moderate
credit-quality projects.
c. The
rating scale could also be used for deciding on the tenure of the proposed
assistance.
d.
The rating
scale could also
be used to
decide on the
frequency/
intensity
of monitoring of the exposure. Banks may also use the rating scale to keep a
close track of deteriorating credit quality and decide on the remedial measures
which the deterioration may warrant. For instance, the frequency of
surveillance on category 5 exposures could be kept at quarterly intervals,
while those on category 3 loans could be half-yearly. More importantly,
movement of an existing exposure to the “unacceptable” category of credit risk
(grades 6 to 9) should directly identify the extent of provisioning (loan loss
reserves) that need to be earmarked for expected losses.
e. Though
loss-provisions are often specified by the regulator (e.g. the RBI provisioning
norms), banks should develop their own internal norms and maintain certain
level of “reasonable over-provisioning” as a best practice. Specifically, while
the credit exposure/ asset is clearly facing rapid/ steady erosion and is on
the downhill transition path, anticipatory provisioning can be done based on
the calibrations on the risk-rating scale. These provisions could be in the
nature of general provisions.
2.5 Operating
Design of the CRF
2.5.1 Which Exposures are Rated?
The
first element of the operating design is to determine which exposures are
required to be rated through the CRF. There may be a case for size-based
classification of exposures and linking the risk-rating process to these
size-based categories. The shortcoming of this arrangement is that though
significant credit migration/deterioration/erosion occurs in the smaller sized
exposures, these are not captured by the CRF. In addition, the size-criteria
are also linked with the tenure-criteria for an exposure. In several instances,
large-sized exposures over a short tenure may not require the extent of
surveillance and credit monitoring that is required for a smaller sized
long-tenure exposure. Given this apparent lack of clarity, a policy of ‘all exposures are to be rated’ should
be followed.
2.5.2 The Risk-Rating Process
The
credit approval process within the bank is expected to replicate the flow of
analysis/ appraisal of credit-risk calibration on the CRF. As indicated above
the CRF may be designed in such a way that the risk rating has certain linkages
with the amount, tenure and pricing of exposure. These default linkages may be
either specified upfront or may be developed with empirical details over a period
of time. The risk rating assigned to each credit proposal would thus directly
lead into the related decisions of acceptance (or rejection), amount, tenure
and pricing of the (accepted) proposal.
For
each proposal, the credit/ risk staff would assign a rating and forward the
recommendation to the higher level of credit selection process. The proposed
risk rating is either reaffirmed or re-calibrated at the time of final credit
approval and sanction. Any revisions that may become necessary in the
risk-ratings are utilised to upgrade the CRF system and the operating
guidelines. In this manner, the CRF maintains its “incremental upgradation”
feature and changes in the lending environment are captured by the system. The
risk-rating process would be equally relevant in the credit-monitoring/
surveillance stage. All changes in the underlying credit-quality are calibrated
on the risk-scale and corresponding remedial actions are initiated.
2.5.3 Assigning &
Monitoring Risk-Ratings
In
conventional banks, the practice of segregating the “relationship management”
and the “credit appraisal” functions is quite prevalent. One of the variants of
this arrangement is that responsibilities for calibration on the risk-rating
scale are divided between the “relationship” and the “credit” groups. All large
sized exposures (above a limit) are appraised independently by the “credit”
group. Generally, the activities of assigning and approving risk-ratings need
to be segregated. Though the front-office or conventional relationship staff
can assign the risk-ratings, the responsibilities of final approval and
monitoring should be vested with a separate credit staff.
2.5.4 Mechanism of Arriving at
Risk-Ratings
The
risk ratings, as specified above, are collective readings on the pre-specified
scale and reflect the underlying credit-risk for a prospective exposure. The
CRF could be separate for relatively peculiar businesses like banking, finance
companies, real-estate developers, etc. For all industries (manufacturing
sector), a common CRF may be used. The peculiarity of a particular industry can
be captured by assigning different weights to aspects like entry barriers,
access to technology, ability of new
entrants
to access raw materials, etc. The following step-wise activities outline the
indicative process for arriving at risk-ratings.
Step I
|
Identify all the principal business and financial risk
|
elements
|
|
Step
II
|
Allocate
weights to principal risk components
|
Step III
|
Compare with weights given in similar sectors and
|
check
for consistency
|
|
Step IV
|
Establish the key parameters (sub-components of the
|
principal
risk elements)
|
|
Step
V
|
Assign
weights to each of the key parameters
|
Step VI
|
Rank the key parameters on the specified scale
|
Step VII
|
Arrive at the credit-risk rating on the CRF
|
Step VIII
|
Compare
with previous risk-ratings of
similar
|
exposures
and check for consistency
|
|
Step
IX
|
Conclude
the credit-risk calibration on the CRF
|
The
risk-rating process would represent collective decision making principles and
as indicated above, would involve some in-built arrangements for ensuring the
consistency of the output. The rankings would be largely comparative. As a bank’s
perception of the exposure improves/changes during the course of the appraisal,
it may be necessary to adjust the weights and the rankings given to specific
risk-parameters in the CRF. Such changes would be deliberated and the arguments
for substantiating these adjustments would be clearly communicated in the
appraisal documents.
2.5.5 Standardisation and
Benchmarks for Risk-Ratings
In
a lending environment dominated by industrial and corporate credits, the
assignors of risk-ratings utilise benchmarks or pre-specified standards for
assessing the risk profile of a potential borrower. These standards usually
consist of financial ratios and credit-migration statistics, which capture the
financial risks faced by the potential borrower (e.g. operating and financial
leverage, profitability, liquidity, debt-servicing ability, etc.). The business
risks associated with an exposure (e.g. cyclicality of industry, threats of
product or technology substitution etc.) are also addressed in the CRF. The
output of the credit-
with the specified benchmarks for
a particular risk category. In these
cases, the risk rating is fairly
standardised and CRF allocates a grade or a
numeric value for the overall risk
profile of the proposed exposure.
Illustration
The CRF may specify that for the
risk-rating exercise:
If Gross Revenues are between
Rs.800 to Rs.1000 crore
|
assign a score of 2
|
If Operating Margin is 20% or
more
|
assign a score of 2
|
If Return on Capital Employed
(ROCE) is 25% or more
|
assign a score of 1
|
If Debt : Equity is between 0.60
and 0.80
|
assign a score of 2
|
If interest cover is 3.50 or more
|
assign a score of 1
|
If Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(DSCR) is 1.80 or more
|
assign a score of 1
|
The
next step would be to assign weights to these risk-parameters. In an industrial
credit environment, the CRF may place higher weights on size (as captured in
gross revenues), profitability of operations (operating margins), financial
leverage (debt: equity) and debt-servicing ability (interest cover). Assume
that the CRF assigns a 20% weightage to each of these four parameters and the
ROCE and DSCR are given a 10% weightage each. The weighted-average score for
the financial risk of the proposed exposure is 1.40, which would correspond
with the extremely low risk/highest safety level-category of the CRF (category
1). Similarly, the business and the management risk of the proposed exposure
are assessed and an overall/ comprehensive risk rating is assigned.
The industrial credit environment
permits a significantly higher level of
benchmarking and standardisation,
specifically in reference to calibration
of
financial risks associated
with credit exposures.
For all prominent
industry-categories, any
lender can compile
profitability, leverage and
debt-servicing details and utilise
these to develop internal benchmarks for
the CRF. As evident, developing
such benchmarks and risk-standards for
a portfolio of project finance
exposures, as in the case of the bank, would
be an altogether diverse exercise.
The CRF may also use qualitative/ subjective factors in the credit
decisions. Such factors are both
internal and external to the company.
Internal factors could include
integrity and quality of management of the
borrower, quality of inventories/
receivables and the ability of borrowers
to
raise finance from other sources. External factors would include views on the
economy and industry such as growth prospects, technological change and
options.
2.5.6 Written Communications
and Formality of Procedure
The
two critical aspects of the formality of procedure in the risk-rating process
are
(i)
the process-flow through which a credit-transaction would
flow across various units and
(ii)
the written communication on the risk-ratings assigned to
a particular proposal.
The
process-flow required for the credit appraisal exercise, may be explicitly
drafted and communicated. It may clearly identify the transactions and linkages
between various operating units of the bank.
The
above discussion broadly presents some of the essential dimensions in the design
of a CRF by banks. These details are indicative of the scope of work required
for the CRF. Banks may make appropriate modifications to suit their
requirements.
2.6 CRFs and aggregation of Credit-Risk
Analysing
exposures using the CRF technique would highlight the spread (or
frequency-distribution) of the credit-risk in the bank’s asset portfolio and
would give an indication for its future asset build-up efforts. This section
briefly covers some aspects of portfolio credit-risk management, a process
which would possibly be facilitated by implementing the CRF.
2.6.1 Portfolio Surveillance
and Reporting
The
conventional internal MIS of a bank would identify the problem-loans in the
asset portfolio, as per the guidelines given by the regulator (i.e. the
asset-classification guidelines of RBI). These details, however, represent only
a component of the credit-risks accumulated in the asset portfolio of a bank.
The CRF can be used for informing the top management on the
frequency
distribution of assets across risk-rating scale, the extent of migration in the
past (e.g. movement of exposures from higher to lower risk-categories or
vice-versa) and the anticipated developments in the aggregated credit portfolio.
The senior management may benefit from such outputs in terms of steering the
organisation through various risk-cycles (e.g. initial low-risk low-return
phase to consolidation and further to an incremental rise in relatively
high-risk high-return exposures).
2.6.2 Adequate Levels of
Provisioning for Credit Events
The
spread of the asset portfolio across the risk-rating scale and the trends in
rating migration would allow the bank management to determine the level of
provisioning required, in addition to the regulatory minimum, to absorb
unanticipated erosions in the credit quality of the assets. In most cases,
provisions for loan-losses are based on the prevailing regulatory and
accounting directives. However, the management may find merit in certain
prudent level of “over-provisioning”. This exercise may add stability and
resilience to the capital adequacy and profitability of the bank.
The
extent of provisioning required could be estimated from the Expected Loss on
Default (which is a product of the Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given
Default (LGD). Since these probabilities can be assigned only after significant
empirical details are available, an alternative would be to adopt a policy of
allocating/ provisioning an amount which may be a proportion of the aggregate
exposures in the risk-rating scale which reflect the likelihood of the assets
slipping into the NPA category.
2.6.3 Guidelines for Asset
Build-up, Aggregate Profitability and Pricing
As
discussed earlier, a clear analysis of the prevailing risk-posture of the bank,
facilitated by the CRF, would give strong recommendations for future asset
build-up and business development activities. The extent of provisioning would
be based on actual and anticipated erosion in credit quality and would define
the “cost” of maintaining an exposure in the
Guidance
Note _ Credit Risk _ October_ 2002
bank’s
credit portfolio. A similar analysis could be undertaken for a specific
credit-product and the risk-adjusted return can be assessed. This will involve
an analysis of the pricing-decisions, provisioning requirements, loss on
default and the incremental impact on bank’s profitability.
2.6.4 Interaction
with External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI) The benefits of such a
CRF system, in addition to those described above, could include a more amenable
interaction with rating agencies and regulatory bodies. As regards investment
ratings the parameters laid down in para 4.1 of the Risk Management Guidelines
issued by RBI in October, 1999 may be followed, i.e., the proposals for
investments should also be subjected to the same degree of credit risk
analysis, as any loan proposals. The proposals should be subjected to detailed
appraisal and rating framework that factors in financial and non-financial
parameters of issuers, sensitivity to external developments, etc. The maximum
exposure to a customer should be bank-wide and include all exposures assumed by
the Credit and Treasury Departments. The coupon on non-sovereign papers should
be commensurate with their risk profile. The banks should exercise due caution,
particularly in investment proposals, which are not rated and should ensure
comprehensive risk evaluation. There should be greater interaction between
Credit and Treasury Departments and the portfolio analysis should also cover
the total exposures, including investments. The rating migration of the issuers
and the consequent diminution in the portfolio quality should also be tracked
at periodic intervals.
Chapter
3 - Credit Risk Models
3.1
A credit risk model seeks to determine, directly or indirectly, the answer to
the following question: Given our past experience and our assumptions about the
future, what is the present value of a given loan or fixed income security? A
credit risk model would also seek to determine the (quantifiable) risk that the
promised cash flows will not be forthcoming. The techniques for measuring
credit risk that have evolved over the last twenty years are prompted by these
questions and dynamic changes in the loan market.
3.1.1
The increasing importance of credit risk modelling should be seen as the
consequence of the following three factors:
·
Banks are becoming increasingly quantitative in their
treatment of credit risk.
·
New markets are emerging in credit derivatives and the
marketability of existing loans is increasing through securitisation/ loan
sales market.
·
Regulators are concerned to improve the current system of
bank capital requirements especially as it relates to credit risk.
3.1.2
Credit Risk Models have assumed importance because they provide the decision
maker with insight or knowledge that would not otherwise be readily available
or that could be marshalled at prohibitive cost. In a marketplace where margins
are fast disappearing and the pressure to lower pricing is unrelenting, models
give their users a competitive edge. The credit risk models are intended to aid
banks in quantifying, aggregating and managing risk across geographical and
product lines. The outputs of these models also play increasingly important
roles in banks’ risk management and performance measurement processes, customer
profitability analysis, risk-based pricing, active portfolio management and
capital structure decisions. Credit risk modeling may result in better internal
risk management and may have the potential to be used in the supervisory
oversight of banking organisations.
3.2 In the measurement of credit
risk, models may be classified along
three different
dimensions: the techniques
employed, the domain
of
applications in the credit process
and the products to which they are
applied.
3.2.1 Techniques: The following are the more commonly used techniques:
(a) Econometric Techniques such as linear and multiple discriminant analysis, multiple
regression, logic analysis and probability of default, etc.
(b) Neural networks are computer-based systems that
use the same data employed in the
econometric techniques but arrive at the decision model using alternative
implementations of a trial and error method.
(c) Optimisation models are mathematical programming techniques that discover the optimum
weights for borrower and loan attributes that minimize lender error and
maximise profits.
(d) Rule-based or expert systems are
characterised by a set of decision
rules, a knowledge base consisting of data such as industry financial ratios,
and a structured inquiry process to be used by the analyst in obtaining the
data on a particular borrower.
(e) Hybrid Systems In these systems simulation are
driven in part by a direct causal
relationship, the parameters of which are determined through estimation
techniques.
3.2.2 Domain of application: These models are
used in a variety of domains:
(a) Credit approval: Models are used on a stand alone
basis or in conjunction with a
judgemental override system for approving credit in the consumer lending
business. The use of such models has expanded to include small business
lending. They are generally not used in approving large corporate loans, but
they may be one of the inputs to a decision.
(b) Credit rating determination:
Quantitative models are used in deriving
‘shadow bond rating’ for unrated securities and commercial loans. These ratings
in turn influence portfolio limits and other lending limits used by the
institution. In some instances, the credit rating predicted by the model is
used within
an
institution to challenge the rating assigned by the traditional credit analysis
process.
(c) Credit
risk models may be used to suggest the risk
premia that should be charged in view of the probability of loss and the
size of the loss given default. Using a mark-to-market model, an institution
may evaluate the costs and benefits of holding a financial asset. Unexpected
losses implied by a credit model may be used to set the capital charge in
pricing.
(d) Early warning: Credit models are used to flag
potential problems in the portfolio
to facilitate early corrective action.
(e) Common credit language: Credit models may be used to
select assets from a pool to
construct a portfolio acceptable to investors at the time of asset
securitisation or to achieve the minimum credit quality needed to obtain the
desired credit rating. Underwriters may use such models for due diligence on
the portfolio (such as a collateralized pool of commercial loans).
(f) Collection strategies: Credit models may be used in
deciding on the best collection or
workout strategy to pursue. If, for example, a credit model indicates that a
borrower is experiencing short-term liquidity problems rather than a decline in
credit fundamentals, then an appropriate workout may be devised.
3.3
Credit Risk Models: Approaches
3.3.1 The
literature on quantitative
risk modelling has
two different
approaches to credit risk measurement. The first approach is the
development of statistical models
through analysis of historical data. This
approach was frequently used in
the last two decades. The second type of
modelling approach tries to
capture distribution of the firm's asset-value
over a period of time.
3.3.2 The statistical approach
tries to rate the firms on a discrete or
continuous scale. The linear model
introduced by Altman (1967), also
known as the Z-score Model, separates defaulting firms from non-
defaulting ones on the basis of
certain financial ratios. Altman, Hartzell,
and Peck (1995,1996) have modified
the original Z-score model to develop
a
model specific to
emerging markets. This
model is known
as the
Emerging Market Scoring (EMS)
model.
3.3.3 The second type of modelling approach tries
to capture distribution
of the firm's asset-value over a
period of time. This model is based on the
expected default frequency (EDF)
model. It calculates the asset value of a
firm from the market value of its
equity using an option pricing based
approach that recognizes equity as
a call option on the underlying asset of
the firm. It tries to estimate the
asset value path of the firm over a time
horizon. The default risk is the
probability of the estimated asset value
falling below a pre-specified default point. This model is based
conceptually on
Merton's (1974) contingent
claim framework and
has
been working very well for
estimating default risk in a liquid market.
3.3.4 Closely related to credit risk models are portfolio risk models. In
the last three years, important
advances have been made in modelling
credit risk in lending portfolios.
The new models are designed to quantify
credit risk
on a portfolio
basis, and thus
are applied at
the time of
diversification as well as
portfolio based pricing. These models estimate
the loss distribution associated
with the portfolio and identify the risky
components by assessing the risk
contribution of each member in the
portfolio.
3.4 Banks may adopt any model depending on their
size, complexity, risk
bearing capacity and risk
appetite, etc. However, the credit risk models
followed by banks should, at the
least, achieve the following:
v Result in differentiating the
degree of credit risk in different credit exposures of a bank. The system could
provide for transaction-based or borrower-based rating or both. It is
recommended that all exposures are to be rated. Restricting risk measurement to
only large sized exposures may fail to capture the portfolio risk in entirety
for variety of reasons. For instance, a large sized exposure for a short time may
be less risky than a small sized exposure for a long time
v Identify concentration in the
portfolios
v Identify problem credits before
they become NPAs
v Identify adequacy/ inadequacy of
loan provisions
v Help in pricing of credit
v Recognise
variations in macro-economic factors and a possible impact under alternative
scenarios
v Determine
the impact on profitability of transactions and relationship.
Chapter
4 - Portfolio Management and Risk Limits
4.1.
The need for credit portfolio management emanates from the necessity to
optimize the benefits associated with diversification and reduce the potential
adverse impact of concentration of exposures to a particular borrower, sector
or industry. The conventional approach to credit portfolio management has been
largely based on the counter party exposure limits, which largely provides the
guideline for incremental asset/ exposure build-up. This “forward” or
incremental approach to credit portfolio management is, to an extent, a
reactive strategy and though it does guide the decision-making process, it has
limited contribution for managing the existing credit portfolio of the bank.
4.2
The recent developments in the measurement and management of portfolio credit
risk have been based on two key attributes: correlation and volatility.
Consider two companies, one operates large capacities in the steel sector and
the other a large player in the cement sector, promoted by two entirely
unrelated promoters. Though these would classify as two separate counter
parties, both of them may be highly sensitive to the Government’s expenditure
in new projects/ investments. Thus, reduction in Government investments could
impact these two companies simultaneously (correlation), impacting the
credit-quality of such a portfolio (volatility), even though from a regulatory
or conventional perspective, the risk had been diversified (2 separate
promoters, 2 separate industries). Thus, though the credit portfolio may be
well diversified and fulfils the prescribed criteria for counter party exposure
limits, the high correlation in potential performance between two counter
parties may impact the portfolio quality (default levels) under stress
conditions.
4.3 In
addition to the widespread instances of high correlation and resultant
volatility, the emergence of new techniques for managing a bank’s credit
portfolio have actively contributed to the development and adoption of broader
credit risk management practices. Specifically, the
adoption
and wider acceptance of securitisation of loan assets in the developed markets
has permitted banks to pursue credit portfolio management on a proactive
manner. These have usually been in the nature of collateralised loan
obligations. Though securitisation of loan receivables, mainly consumer and
auto loans, has been prevalent in India, it has usually been deployed as an
asset acquisition or a hive-off approach rather than active credit portfolio
management. The steps taken to enhance the liquidity and depth of debt markets
in India and simplify the process of securitisation are expected to improve the
prospects of credit portfolio management in the near future.
4.4
The measurement of credit-portfolio concentration has been elaborated in detail
in the regulatory prescriptions for counter-party exposures in India. The issue
of credit portfolio correlation is discussed here in some detail. In
statistical terms, credit portfolio correlation would mean the number of times
companies/ counter-parties in a portfolio defaulted simultaneously. As evident,
this analysis is impossible in practice and the number of such instances for
developing a reasonable generalisation would be too few. Some credit portfolio
management techniques developed overseas estimate the correlation between
defaults and bond-market spreads and generalise this for assessing the
correlation in a given portfolio. Given the limited data on corporate bond
market spreads and their statistical linkages with ratings in India, this
approach may not be appropriate for Indian banks at this stage. Banks should,
however, direct their data management efforts in this direction so that a
beginning in active portfolio management can be made.
4.5
One possible technique for analysing credit-portfolio correlation is based on a
macro-economic factor model. This approach involves projecting the performance
(volatility) of a credit portfolio under altering macro-economic environments.
In specific terms, this would involve a stress-test on the debt-servicing
ability of a portfolio of borrowers under alternative scenarios. The input data
would consist of the projected financial performance (income statement and
balance sheet details) of
each
of these portfolio constituents. In the appraisal system adopted by Indian
banks in general, these are normally developed for individual borrowers for
seeking credit approvals from the specific internal authorities. Such portfolio
constituents could be relatively independent counterparties, spanning a
relatively wide spectrum of region, industry, size of operation, adoption of technology
and promoters. The key financial parameters of these counterparties (growth,
profitability, access to funds, etc.) should be linked to the macro-economic
parameters under consideration. Some of the relevant macro-economic parameters
could include overall growth rates, growth in exports/ industrial/ agricultural
sectors, interest rates, exchange rates, import duties, equity market and
liquidity conditions. By developing alternative scenarios for these parameters,
the credit-portfolio’s aggregate performance (default rates and levels) can be
assessed and possible correlation between a set of obligors (even though they
constitute entirely separate counterparties) may be established. For instance,
under the assumptions of low overall economic growth, poor growth in
agriculture sector and reduction in import duties, the assessment may give some
correlation between the borrowers in the petrochemicals industry and the
consumer-electronics industry. Though there may not be any “counter party”
relationship in this set of borrowers, both of them are possibly susceptible to
reduced import duties and low economic growth. These illustrations are
relatively simplistic and the detailed analysis, as discussed above, may give
critical inputs for minimising the credit risk of the given portfolio. A
possible advantage of starting with the macro-economic factor model is that it
is amenable to the current levels of credit risk assessment practices in Indian
banks and can be correspondingly adopted with relative ease. Though superior
and more sophisticated tools have been developed, their findings may be limited
due to the lack of representative data. Such options can be considered as
Indian banks further enhance their internal systems and processes in credit
risk management.
Chapter
5 – Managing Credit Risk in Inter-bank Exposure
5.1
During the course of its business, a bank may assume exposures on other banks,
arising from trade transactions, money placements for liquidity management
purposes, hedging, trading and transactional banking services such as clearing
and custody, etc. Such transactions entail a credit risk, as defined, and
therefore, it is important that a proper credit evaluation of the banks is
undertaken. It must cover both the interpretation of the bank's financial
statements as well as forming a judgement on non-financial areas such as
management, ownership, peer/ market perception and country factors.
5.2 The key financial parameters
to be evaluated for any bank are:
a)
Capital
Adequacy
b)
Asset
Quality
c)
Liquidity
d)
Profitability
Banks
will normally have access to information available publicly to assess the
credit risk posed by the counter party bank.
5.2.1 Capital Adequacy
5.2.1.1
Banks with high capital ratios above the regulatory minimum levels,
particularly Tier I, will be assigned a high rating whereas the banks with low
ratios well below the standards and with low ability to access capital will be
at the other end of the spectrum.
5.2.1.2
Capital adequacy needs to be appropriate to the size and structure of the
balance sheet as it represents the buffer to absorb losses during difficult
times. Over capitalization can impact overall profitability. Related to the
issue of capitalization, is also the ability to raise fresh capital as and when
required. Publicly listed banks and state owned banks may be best positioned to
raise capital whilst the unlisted private banks or regional banks are dependant
entirely on the wealth and/ or credibility of their owners.
5.2.1.3
The capital adequacy ratio is normally indicated in the published audited
accounts. In addition, it will be useful to calculate the Capital to Total
Assets ratio which indicates the owners' share in the assets of the business.
The ratio of Tier I capital to Total Assets represents the extent to which the
bank can absorb a counterparty collapse. Tier I capital is not owed to anyone
and is available to cover possible losses. It has no maturity or repayment
requirement, and is expected to remain a permanent component of the counter
party's capital.
5.2.1.4
The Basel standards currently require banks to have a capital adequacy ratio of
8% with Tier I ratio not less than 4%. The Reserve Bank of India requirement is
9%. The Basel Committee is planning to introduce the New Capital Accord and
these requirements could change the dimension of the capital of banks.
5.2.2
Asset Quality
5.2.2.1
The asset portfolio in its entirety should be evaluated and should include an
assessment of both funded items and off-balance sheet items. Whilst non
performing assets and provisioning ratios will reflect the quality of the loan
book, high volatility of valuations and earnings will reflect exposure to the capital
market and sensitive sectors.
The key ratios to be analysed are
·
Gross
NPAs to Gross Advances ratio,
·
Net
NPAs to Net Advances ratio
·
Provisions
Held to Gross Advances ratio and
·
Provisions
Held to Gross NPAs ratio.
5.2.2.3
Some issues which should be taken cognisance of, and which require further
critical examination are:
- where
exposure to a particular sector is above a certain level, say, 10% of total
assets
- where
a significant part of the portfolio is to counter parties based in countries
which are considered to be very risky
-
where
Net NPAs are above a certain level, say, 5% of the loan assets.
-
where loan loss provision is less than a certain level,
say, 50% of the Gross NPA.
- where
high risk/ return lending accounts for the majority of the assets.
- where
there are rapid rates of loan growth. (These can be a precursor to reducing
asset quality as periods of rapid expansion are often followed by slow downs
which make the bank vulnerable.)
-
net
impact of mark-to-market values of treasury transactions.
5.2.2.4
Commercial banks are increasingly venturing into investment banking activities
where asset considerations additionally focus on the marketability of the
assets, as well as the quality of the instruments. Preferably banks should
mark-to-market their entire investment portfolio and treat sticky investments
as "non-performing", which should also be adequately provided for.
5.2.3
Liquidity
5.2.3.1
Commercial bank deposits generally have a much shorter contractual maturity
than loans, and liquidity management needs to provide a cushion to cover
anticipated deposit withdrawals. The key ratios to be analysed are
·
Total Liquid Assets to Total Assets ratio (the higher the
ratio the more liquid the bank is),
·
Total Liquid Assets to Total Deposits ratio (this measures
the bank's ability to meet withdrawals),
·
Loans
to Deposits ratio and
·
Inter-bank
deposits to total deposits ratio.
5.2.3.2
It is necessary to develop an appropriate level of correlation between assets
and liabilities. Account should be taken of the extent to which borrowed funds
are required to bolster capital and the respective redemption profiles.
5.2.4
Profitability
5.2.4.1 A consistent year on year growth in
profitability is required to
provide an acceptable return to
shareholders and retain resources to fund
future growth. The key ratios to
be analysed are:
·
Return
on Average Assets (measures a bank's growth/ decline in profits in comparison
with its balance sheet expansion/ contraction),
·
Return on Equity (provides an indication of how well the
bank is performing for its owners),
·
Net
Interest Margin (measures the difference between interest paid and interest
earned, and therefore a bank's ability to earn interest income) and
·
Operating Expenses to Net Revenue ratio (the cost/income
ratio of the bank).
5.2.4.2 The degree of reliance upon interest income
compared with fees
earned, heavy dependency on
certain sectors, and the sustainability of
income streams are relevant
factors to be borne in mind.
5.2.4.3 The ability of a bank to
analyse another bank on the above lines will
depend upon the information
available publicly and also the strength of
disclosures in the financial
statements.
5.3
In
addition to the quantitative indices, other key parameters to be assessed are:
·
Ownership
·
Management
ability
·
Peer
comparison/ Market perception
·
Country
of incorporation/ Regulatory environment
Ownership
5.3.1 The spread and nature of the ownership
structure is important, as
it impinges on the propensity to
induct additional capital. Support from a
large body of shareholders is
difficult to obtain if the bank's performance
is adverse, whilst a smaller
shareholder base constrains the ability to
garner funds.
Management Ability
5.3.2
Frequent changes in senior management, change in a key figure, and the lack of
succession planning need to be viewed with suspicion. Risk management is a key
indicator of the management's ability as it is integral to the health of any
institution. Risk management should be deeply embedded and respected in the
culture of the financial institution.
Peer Comparison/ Market Perception
5.3.3
It is recognized that balance sheets tend to show different structures from one
country to another, and from one type of bank to another. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to assess a bank's financial statements against those of its
comparable peers. Similarly market sentiment is highly important to a bank's
ability to maintain an adequate funding base, but is not necessarily reflective
of published information. Special notice should be taken where the overall
performance of the peer sector, in general, falls below international
standards.
Country of Incorporation/
Regulatory Environment
5.3.4
Country risk needs to be evaluated since a bank which is financially strong may
not be permitted to meet its commitments in view of the regulatory environment
or the financial state of the country in which it is operating in.
5.4
Banks should be rated (called Bank Tierings) on the basis of the above factors.
An indicative tiering scale is:1
Bank
Tier
|
Description
|
|||
1
|
Low risk
|
|||
2
|
Modest risk
|
|||
3
|
Satisfactory
risk
|
|||
4
|
Fair Risk
|
|||
5
|
Acceptable Risk
|
|||
6
|
Watch List
|
|||
7
|
Substandard
|
|||
8
|
Doubtful
|
|||
9
|
Loss
|
5.5
Facilities
Facilities to banks can be
classified into three categories:
a)
On balance sheet items such as cash advances, bond
holdings and investments, and off-balance sheet items which are not subject to
market fluctuation risk such as guarantees, acceptances and letters of credit.
b)
Facilities which are off-balance sheet and subject to
market fluctuation risk such as foreign exchange and derivative products.
c)
Settlement facilities: These cover risks arising through
payment systems or through settlement of treasury and securities transactions.
The tiering system enables a bank
to establish internal parameters to help
determine acceptable limits of
exposure to a particular bank/ banking
group. These parameters should be
used to determine the maximum level of
(a) and
(b) above, maximum tenors for term products which may be considered prudent for
a bank and settlement limits. Medium term loan facilities and standby
facilities should be sanctioned very exceptionally. Standby lines, by their
very nature, are likely to be drawn only at a time when the risk in making
funds available is generally perceived to be unattractive.
Bank-wise exposure limits should
be set taking into account the counter
party and country risks. The
credit risk management of exposure to banks
should be centralised on a
bank-wide basis.
1 The rating scale for bank rating should be in
tandem with CRF to synthesize credit risk on account of all activities for the
bank as a whole.
Chapter
6 – Credit Risk in Off-balance sheet Exposures
Risk
Identification and Assessment of Limits
6.1. Credit Risk in non-fund based
business of banks need to be assessed
in a manner similar to the
assessment of fund based business since it has
the potential to become a funded
liability in case the customer is not able
to meet his commitments. Financial
guarantees are generally long term in
nature, and assessment of these
requirements should be similar to the
evaluation of requests for term
loans. As contracts are generally for a term
of 2-3 years, banks must obtain
cash flows over this time horizon, arising
from the
specific contract they
intend to support,
and determine the
viability of financing the
contract.
Risk
Monitoring and Control
6.2 For reducing credit risk on account of such off balance sheet
exposures, banks may adopt a
variety of measures some of which are
indicated below:
i)
Banks must ensure that the security, which is available to
the funded lines, also covers the LC lines and the guarantee facilities. On
some occasions, it will be appropriate to take a charge over the fixed assets
as well, especially in the case of long-term guarantees.
ii)
In the case of guarantees covering contracts, banks must
ensure that the clients have the requisite technical skills and experience to
execute the contracts. The value of the contracts must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, and separate limits should be set up for each contract. The
progress vis-à-vis physical and financial indicators should be monitored
regularly, and any slippages should be highlighted in the credit review.
iii)
The strategy to sanction non-fund facilities with a view
to increase earnings should be properly balanced vis-à-vis the risk involved
and extended only after a thorough assessment of credit risk is undertaken.
Chapter 7 – Country Risk
7.1
Country risk is the possibility that a country
will be unable to service
or repay its debts to foreign
lenders in a timely manner. In banking, this
risk
arises on account of cross border lending and investment. The risk
manifests itself either in the inability or the unwillingness of the obligor
to meet its liability.
Country risk comprises of the
following risks:
·
Transfer risk which is the core risk under
country risk, arises on account of the possibility of
losses due to restrictions on external remittances. Consequently, an obligor
may be able to pay in local currency, but may not be able to pay in foreign
currency. This type of risk may occur when foreign exchange shortages either
close or restrict a country’s cross border foreign exchange market.
·
Sovereign
risk is
associated with lending to government of a sovereign nation or to taking
government guarantees. The risk lies in the fact that sovereign entities may
claim immunity from legal process or might not abide by a judgement, and it
might prove impossible to secure redress through legal action. Ordinarily, it
is assumed that there will be no default by a sovereign. This, however, does
not mean that there is no risk involved in sovereign lending, for the risk may
manifest itself in terms of rehabilitation of an indebted country in terms of
financial solvency and liquidity for which there may be rescheduling of country
debt or external debt.
·
Non-sovereign
or political risk arises
when political environment or legislative process of a country
leads to Government taking over the assets of the financial entity (e.g.
nationalisation) and preventing discharge of its liabilities in a manner that
had been agreed to. It is also referred to as risk of appropriation and
expropriation. Non-sovereign risk includes, in addition to sovereign risk,
private claims and direct investments like lending to corporates and project
finance lending and includes risks associated with legal frameworks and
economic environment.
·
Cross border risk arises on account of the borrower
being a resident of a country other than the country where the cross border
asset is booked, and includes exposures to local residents denominated in
currencies other than the local currency.
·
Currency risk is the possibility that exchange
rate changes will alter the expected amount of principal
and return of the lending or investment. At times, banks may try to cope with
this specific risk on the lending side by shifting the risk associated with
exchange rate fluctuations to the borrowers. The risk however does not get
extinguished, but gets converted to credit risk.
·
Macroeconomic and Structural Fragility Risk has
come into prominence after the East Asian crises of 1990s. In these
crises firms could purchase foreign exchange to service foreign debt but
collapse of exchange rates and surge in interest rates due to severe government
restrictions on firms owning external debt resulted in highly unfavourable
exchange rates and very high interest costs on domestic borrowings for these
firms. This severely impaired these firms’ ability to service foreign debt. The
structural fragility risk can also include that associated with poor
development of domestic bankruptcy laws and weak courts for their enforcement.
7.2 Broad
Contours of Country Risk Management (CRM)
The broad contours of CRM are:
·
Risk
Categories
·
Country
Risk Assessments
·
Fixing
of country limits
·
Monitoring
of country exposures
7.2.1 Risk Categories
Countries
can be broadly classified into six risk categories – insignificant, low,
moderate, high, very high and off-credit. IBA would be assigned the responsibility
of developing a mechanism for assigning countries to the six risk categories
specified above. Banks may be allowed to adopt a more conservative categorisation of the countries.
7.2.2 Country Risk (CR) Assessment
To
begin with, banks may adopt the sovereign ratings of international credit
rating agencies. However, banks should eventually put in place appropriate
systems to move over to internal assessment of country risk within a prescribed
period, say by 31 March 2005. Banks may adopt the ratings of any of the
international credit rating agencies during the transition period. In case
there is divergence in the ratings accorded to any country by the international
credit rating agencies, banks may adopt the lower/ lowest of the ratings.
Banks
should also evolve sound systems for measuring and monitoring country risk. The
system should be able to identify the full dimensions of country risk as well
as incorporating features that acknowledge the links between credit and market
risk. Banks should use a variety of internal and external sources as a means to
measure country risk. Banks should not rely solely on rating agencies or other
external sources as their only country risk-monitoring tool. Banks should also
incorporate information from the relevant country managers of their foreign
branches into their country risk assessments. However, the rating accorded by a
bank to any country should not be better than the rating of that country by the
international rating agency.
The
frequency of periodic reviews of country risk ratings should be at least once a
year with a provision to review the rating of specific country, based on any
major events in that country, where bank exposure is high, even before the next
periodical review of the ratings is due.
7.2.4 Fixing of country limits
Bank
Boards may set country exposure limits in relation to the bank’s regulatory
capital (Tier I + Tier II) with sub-limits, if considered necessary for
products, branches, maturity etc. The basis for setting the limits for the
country/ category shall be left to the discretion of the banks’ Boards. The
country exposure limits set by the Board should be reviewed periodically.
Exposure
limit for any country should not exceed its regulatory capital, except in the
case of insignificant risk category. In respect of foreign banks, the
regulatory capital would be the capital held in their Indian books.
Banks
may also set up regional exposure limits for country groups, at the discretion
of their Boards. The Board may decide on the basis for grouping of countries
and also lay down the guidelines regarding all aspects of such regional
exposure limits.
7.3.5 Monitoring of country
exposures
Banks
should monitor their country exposures on a weekly basis before switching over
to real-time monitoring. However, exposures to high-risk (and above) categories
should be monitored on a real-time basis. Banks should switchover to real-time
monitoring of country exposures (all categories) by 31st March 2004.
Boards
should review the country risk exposures at every meeting. The review should
include progress in establishing internal country rating systems, compliance
with the regulatory and the internal limits, results
of
stress tests and the exit options available to the banks in respect of
countries belonging to ‘high risk & above’ categories.
Management
of country risk should incorporate stress testing as one method to monitor
actual and potential risks. Stress testing should include an assessment of the
impact of alternative outcomes to important underlying assumptions.
Country
risk management processes employed by banks would require adequate internal
controls that include audits or other appropriate oversight mechanisms to
ensure the integrity of the information used by senior officials in overseeing
compliance with policies and limits.
Chapter
8 – Loan Review Mechanism/ Credit Audit
Credit
Audit examines compliance with extant sanction and post-sanction processes/
procedures laid down by the bank from time to time.
8.1
Objectives of Credit Audit
Ø Improvement in the quality of
credit portfolio
Ø Review sanction process and
compliance status of large loans
Ø Feedback on regulatory compliance
Ø Independent review of Credit Risk
Assessment
Ø Pick-up early warning signals and
suggest remedial measures
Ø
Recommend corrective action to improve credit quality,
credit administration and credit skills of staff, etc.
8.2
Structure of Credit Audit Department
The
credit audit / loan review mechanism may be assigned to a specific Department
or the Inspection and Audit Department.
8.3
Functions of Credit Audit Department
Ø To process Credit Audit Reports
Ø
To analyse Credit Audit findings and advise the
departments/ functionaries concerned
Ø To follow up with controlling
authorities
Ø To apprise the Top Management
Ø
To process the responses received and arrange for closure
of the relative Credit Audit Reports
Ø To maintain database of advances
subjected to Credit Audit
8.4
Scope and Coverage
The
focus of credit audit needs to be broadened from the account level to look at
the overall portfolio and the credit process being followed. The important
areas are:
8.4.1
Portfolio Review : Examine the
quality of Credit & Investment (Quasi Credit) Portfolio and suggest
measures for improvement, including
reduction
of concentrations in certain sectors to levels indicated in the Loan Policy and
Prudential Limits suggested by RBI.
8.4.2 Loan Review : Review of the sanction
process and status of post sanction processes/ procedures (not just restricted
to large accounts)
·
all fresh proposals and proposals for renewal of limits
(within 3 - 6 months from date of sanction)
·
all existing accounts with sanction limits equal to or
above a cut off depending upon the size of activity
·
randomly selected ( say 5-10%) proposals from the rest of
the portfolio
·
accounts of sister concerns/group/associate concerns of
above accounts, even if limit is less than the cut off
8.4.3 Action Points for Review
o Verify compliance of bank's laid
down policies and regulatory compliance with regard to sanction
o Examine adequacy of documentation
o Conduct the credit risk assessment
o Examine
the conduct of account and follow up looked at by line functionaries
o Oversee
action taken by line functionaries in respect of serious irregularities
o Detect early warning signals and
suggest remedial measures thereof
8.4.4 Frequency of Review
The
frequency of review should vary depending on the magnitude of risk (say, for
the high risk accounts - 3 months, for the average risk accounts- 6 months ,
for the low risk accounts- 1 year).
·
Feedback
on general regulatory compliance.
·
Examine
adequacy of policies, procedures and practices.
·
Review
the Credit Risk Assessment methodology.
·
Examine
reporting system and exceptions thereof.
·
Recommend corrective action for credit administration and
credit skills of staff.
·
Forecast
likely happenings in the near future.
8.5
Procedure to be followed for Credit Audit
Ø
Credit Audit is conducted on site, i.e. at the branch
which has appraised the advance and where the main operative credit limits are made
available.
Ø
Report on conduct of accounts of allocated limits are to
be called from the corresponding branches.
Ø
Credit auditors are not required to visit borrowers’
factory/ office premises.
Chapter
9 – RAROC Pricing/ Economic Profit
9.1 In
acquiring assets, banks should use the pricing mechanism in conjunction with
product/ geography/ industry/ tenor limits. For example, if a bank believes
that construction loans for commercial complexes are unattractive from a
portfolio perspective, it can raise the price of these loans to a level that
will act as a disincentive to borrowers. This is an instance of marginal
cost pricing - the notion that the price of an asset should compensate
the institution for its marginal cost as measured on a risk-adjusted basis.
Marginal cost pricing may not always work. A bank may have idle capacity and
capital that has not been deployed. While such an institution clearly would not
want to make a loan at a negative spread, it would probably view even a small
positive spread as worthwhile as long as the added risk was acceptable.
9.2
Institutions tend to book unattractively priced loans when they are unable to
allocate their cost base with clarity or to make fine differentiations of their
risks. If a bank cannot allocate its costs, then it will make no distinction
between the cost of lending to borrowers that require little analysis and the
cost of lending to borrowers that require a considerable amount of review and
follow up. Similarly, if the spread is tied to a too coarsely graded risk
rating system (one, for example, with just four grades) then it is more
difficult to differentiate among risks when pricing than if the risk rating is
graduated over a larger scale with, say, 15 grades.
9.3 A cost-plus-profit
pricing strategy will work in the short run, but in the long run
borrowers will balk and start looking for alternatives. Cost-plus-profit
pricing will also work when a bank has some flexibility to compete on an array
of services rather than exclusively on price. The difficulties with pricing are
greater in markets where the lender is a price taker rather than a price
leader.
9.4 The pricing is based on the
borrower's risk rating, tenor, collateral,
guarantees, historic loan loss
rates, and covenants. A capital charge is
applied based on a hurdle rate and a capital ratioª . Using these
assumptions,
the rate to be charged for a loan to a customer with a given rating could be
calculated.
9.5 This relatively simple
approach to credit pricing works well as long as
the assumptions are correct -
especially those about the borrower’s credit
quality. This method is used in many
banks today. The main drawbacks
of this method are:
·
Only ‘expected losses’ are linked to the borrower’s credit
quality. The capital charge based on the volatility of losses in the credit
risk category may also be too small. If the loan were to default, the loss
would have to be made up from income from non-defaulting loans.
·
It implicitly assumes only two possible states for a loan:
default or no default. It does not model the credit risk premium or discount
resulting from improvement or decline in the borrower's financial condition,
which is meaningful only if the asset may be repriced or sold at par.
9.6 Banks have long struggled to
find the best ways of allocating capital
in a manner consistent with the
risks taken. They have found it difficult
to come up with a consistent and
credible way of allocating capital for
such varying sources of revenue as
loan commitments, revolving lines of
credit (which have no maturity),
and secured versus unsecured lending.
The different approaches for
allocating capital are as under:
·
One approach is to allocate capital to business units
based on their asset size. Although it is true that a larger portfolio will
have larger losses, this approach also means that the business unit is forced
to employ all the capital allocated to it. Moreover, this method treats all
risks alike.
·
Another approach is to use the regulatory (risk-adjusted)
capital as the allocated capital. The problem with this approach is that
regulatory capital may or may not
reflect the true risk of a
ª
The hurdle rate is defined as the minimum acceptable return on a
business activity.
business.
For example, for regulatory purposes, a loan to a AAA rated customer requires
the same amount of capital per Rupees lent as one to a small business.
·
Yet another approach is to use unexpected losses in a
sub-portfolio (standard deviation of the annual losses taken over time) as a
proxy for capital to be allocated. The problem with this approach is that it
ignores default correlations across sub-portfolios. The volatility of a
sub-portfolio may in fact dampen the volatility of the institution's portfolio,
so pricing decisions based on the volatility of the sub-portfolio may not be
optimal. In practical terms, this means that one line of business within a
lending institution may sometimes subsidize another.
Risk
Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)
9.7 As it became clearer that
banks needed to add an appropriate capital
charge in the pricing process, the
concept of risk adjusting the return or
risk adjusting the capital arose.
The value-producing capacity of an asset
(or a business) is expressed as a
ratio that allows comparisons to be made
between assets (or businesses) of
varying sizes and risk characteristics.
The ratio is based either on the
size of the asset or the size of the capital
allocated to it. When an
institution can observe asset prices directly (and/
or infer risk from observable
asset prices) then it can determine how
much capital to hold based on the
volatility of the asset. This is the
essence of
the mark-to-market concept.
If the capital
to be held
is
excessive relative to the total
return that would be earned from the asset,
then the bank will not acquire it.
If the asset is already in the bank's
portfolio, it will be sold. The
availability of a liquid market to buy and sell
these assets is a precondition for
this approach. When banks talk about
asset concentration and
correlation, the question of capital allocation is
always in the background because
it is allocated capital that absorbs the
potential consequences (unexpected losses) resulting from such
concentration and correlation
causes.
9.8 RAROC
allocates a capital
charge to a
transaction or a line
of
business at an amount equal to the
maximum expected loss (at a 99%
confidence level) over one year on
an after-tax basis. As may be expected,
the
higher the volatility of the returns, the more capital is allocated. The higher
capital allocation means that the transaction has to generate cash flows large
enough to offset the volatility of returns, which results from the credit risk,
market risk, and other risks taken. The RAROC process estimates the
asset value that may prevail in the worst-case scenario and then equates the
capital cushion to be provided for the potential loss.
9.9
RAROC is an improvement over the traditional approach in that it allows one to
compare two businesses with different risk (volatility of returns) profiles. A
transaction may give a higher return but at a higher risk. Using a hurdle rate
(expected rate of return), a lender can also use the RAROC principle to set the
target pricing on a relationship or a transaction. Although not all assets have
market price distribution, RAROC is a first step toward examining an
institution’s entire balance sheet on a mark-to-market basis - if only to
understand the risk-return trade-offs that have been made.
Chapter 10 – New Capital Accord:
Implications for Credit Risk Management
10.1
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision had released in June 1999 the first
Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework
with the intention of replacing the current broad-brush 1988 Accord.
The Basel Committee has released a Second Consultative Document in January
2001, which contains refined proposals for the three pillars of the New Accord –
Minimum Capital Requirements, Supervisory Review and Market Discipline.
10.2
The Committee proposes two approaches, viz., Standardised and Internal Rating
Based (IRB) for estimating regulatory capital. Under the standardised approach, the Committee desires neither to produce a
net increase nor a net decrease, on
an average, in minimum regulatory
capital,
even after accounting for operational risk. Under the IRB approach, the
Committee’s ultimate goals are to ensure that the overall level of regulatory capital is sufficient to address the
underlying credit risks and also provides capital incentives relative to the
standardised approach, i.e., a reduction in the risk weighted assets of 2% to
3% (foundation IRB approach) and 90% of the capital requirement under
foundation approach for advanced IRB approach to encourage banks to adopt IRB
approach for providing capital.
10.3
The minimum capital adequacy ratio would continue to be 8% of the risk-weighted
assets, which cover capital requirements for market (trading book), credit and
operational risks. For credit risk,
the range of options to estimate capital extends to include a standardised, a foundation IRB and an advanced IRB approaches.
10.4.1
Standardised Approach
Under
the standardised approach, preferential risk weights in the range of 0%, 20%,
50%, 100% and 150% would be assigned on the basis of ratings given by external
credit assessment institutions.
Orientation of the IRB Approach
Banks’ internal measures of credit
risk are based on assessments of the risk characteristics of both the borrower
and the specific type of transaction. The probability of default (PD) of a
borrower or group of borrowers is the central measurable concept on which the
IRB approach is built. The PD of a borrower does not, however, provide the
complete picture of the potential credit loss. Banks should also seek to
measure how much they will lose should a borrower default on an obligation.
This is contingent upon two elements. First, the magnitude of likely loss on
the exposure: this is
termed the Loss Given Default (LGD), and is expressed as a percentage of
the exposure. Secondly, the loss is contingent upon the amount to which the
bank was exposed to the borrower at the time of default, commonly expressed as
Exposure at Default (EAD). These three components (PD, LGD, EAD) combine to
provide a measure of expected intrinsic, or economic, loss. The IRB approach
also takes into account the maturity (M) of exposures. Thus, the derivation of
risk weights is dependent on estimates of the PD, LGD and, in some cases, M,
that are attached to an exposure. These components (PD, LGD, EAD, M) form the
basic inputs to the IRB approach, and consequently the capital requirements derived from it.
10.4.2
IRB Approach
The Committee proposes two
approaches – foundation and advanced - as
an alternative to standardised
approach for assigning preferential risk
weights.
Under
the foundation approach,
banks, which comply
with certain
minimum requirements
viz. comprehensive credit
rating system with
capability to quantify Probability
of Default (PD) could assign preferential
risk weights, with the data on
Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at
Default (EAD) provided by the
national supervisors. In order to qualify for
adopting the
foundation approach, the
internal credit rating
system
should have the following
parameters/conditions:
Ø
Each borrower within a portfolio must be assigned the
rating before a loan is originated.
Ø
Minimum of 6 to 9 borrower grades for performing loans and
a minimum of 2 grades for non-performing loans.
Ø
Meaningful distribution of exposure across grades and not
more than 30% of the gross exposures in any one borrower grade.
Ø
Each individual rating assignment must be subject to an
independent review or approval by the Loan Review Department.
Ø Rating must be updated at least on
annual basis.
Ø
The Board of Directors must approve all material aspects
of the rating and PD estimation.
Ø
Internal and External audit must review annually, the
banks’ rating system including the quantification of internal ratings.
Ø
Banks should have individual credit risk control units
that are responsible for the design, implementation and performance of internal
rating systems. These units should be functionally independent.
Ø
Members of staff responsible for rating process should be
adequately qualified and trained.
Ø
Internal rating must be explicitly linked with the banks’
internal assessment of capital adequacy in line with requirements of Pillar 2.
Ø
Banks must have in place sound stress testing process for
the assessment of capital adequacy.
Ø
Banks must have a credible track record in the use of
internal ratings at least for the last 3
years.
Ø
Banks must have robust systems in place to evaluate the
accuracy and consistency with regard to the system, processing and the
estimation of PDs.
Ø
Banks must disclose in greater detail the rating process,
risk factors, validation etc. of the rating system.
Under the advanced approach, banks
would be allowed to use their own
estimates of PD, LGD and EAD, which could be validated by the
supervisors. Under both the approaches, risk weights would
be expressed
as
a single continuous function of the PD, LGD and EAD. The IRB
approach, therefore, does not rely
on supervisory determined risk buckets
as in the case of standardised
approach. The Committee has proposed an
IRB
approach for retail loan portfolio, having homogenous characteristics distinct
from that for the corporate portfolio. The Committee is also working towards
developing an appropriate IRB approach relating to project finance.
10.5
The adoption of the New Accord, in the proposed format, requires substantial
upgradation of the existing credit risk management systems. The New Accord also
provided in-built capital incentives for banks, which are equipped to adopt
foundation or advanced IRB approach. Banks may, therefore, upgrade the credit
risk management systems for optimising capital.
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